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Abstract 
 The Islamist movements are far from homogenous. Pluralistic by 
nature, Moroccan Islamism can be divided into two groups: The Party of 
Justice and Development (Hizbo al- adala wa- Tanmia, PJD) under the 
direction of Abdelilah Benkiran, and Justice and Charity (al- adl wal- Ihsan, 
JC) led by Mohamed Abbadi. All groups and organizations that constituted 
Islamist movements have different and diverse objectives. While the non- 
political groups have no concrete political objectives, they have a number of 
goals closely linked to the religious and moralistic dimension of Islam. On 
the other hand, the Islamist political movements, which are the subject of this 
study, target the restructuring of state- society relations in the image of 
Islam's early golden years; others raised issues of equity and justice in open 
public discourse. The study traces back the birth and the growth of Islamist 
movements, mainly apolitical Salafists and militants, whereas the Islamist 
political movements that grow from a group to a party have evolved 
drastically and differently. 
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 Historically, Islam has always served as a vehicle for the expression 
of socio-political and economic dissent, particularly in times of crises. 
According to Ibahrine (2007), due to their agenda regarding state and 
society, Islam-oriented movements and/or Islamist movements have 
increasingly become assertive. In the context of the weakness of 
institutionalized politics, these movements have now turned to be the leading 
political opposition force or to play the role of governance in the case of PJD 
in Morocco, Nahda (Renaissance) in Tunisia and Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt. 
 Amaghar (2007) states, about three decades ago, that political Islam 
in the Maghreb was exclusively about Algerian and Tunisian variants. 
However, it seemed unlikely that Islamism could emerge in Morocco. He 
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also argues that Moroccan observers and political figures alike were firmly 
convinced that the king's political function – the commander of believers – 
stood as a shield to protect the country from this ideology. However, all that 
changed at the beginning of 1990s when Islamism burst upon the Moroccan 
political scene. 
 Morocco has a history of Sunni movements dating back to the end of 
the eighteenth century (Darif, 1988: 250). The Salafis were followers of a 
late eighteen century reform movement associated with Mohammed Ibn 
Abdel Wahhab. During the twentieth century, the presence of the Salafi 
strand in the nationalist movement and the struggle for independence marked 
the orientation of the movement. This current was identified with the Salafi 
thinkers, such as Taki Dine Al Hilali and Allal Al-fassi. The Salafi 
movement advocated the return to the basic sources of Islam, the Qur'an and 
the Sunna. It stressed the religious identity of the national community and 
emphasized the need to sustain its authenticity understood as the Islamic 
religion. 
 The term 'Sunni' or 'Salafi' is widely used in Morocco to refer to 
those Moroccans who are "puritans" and claim they merely follow the 
practice and theology of prophet Mohammed's followers in the early time of 
Islam (Munson, 1993: 154). The Sunni movement (Al- Faqih Al- Zamzami 
and Mohamed Fezzazi in Tangiers and Mohammed Maghrawi in Marrakesh) 
is not organized in political groups.   
 One obvious aim of the Sunni is to increase the educational and 
moral levels of Moroccan people and to renew their understanding of Islamic 
spiritual activities. They are concerned in implementing Shari’a (Islamic 
Law) in a range of ritual and personal behavioral practices linked to worship 
and everyday behavior. 
 Another facet of the Salafi landscape in Morocco is the small but 
militant groups (Ibahrine, 2007: 113). The beginning of these new offshoots 
from Sunni groups dates back to about 1990s when veteran Mujahidins in 
Afghanistan returned and began forming small-size groups. Most of the 
small militant groups have been active mainly in poor sections of large urban 
centers, such as Casablanca, Fes, Sale and Tangiers where the famous 
preachers of the Salafi tendency were based (Ibahrine, 2007: 114). Asserting 
that Islam is not just a set of beliefs and ritual actions but a comprehensive 
ideology embracing public as well as personal life, they call for the 
implementation of Shari’a in all walks of life (Darif, 1992). They preached 
strict adherence to the founding principles of Islam. Among the key 
ideological concepts that place these groups in a different category than 
Islamist political movements, for instance, are the concepts of "Al- Jahiliya" 
and "Jihad". Muslims are called upon to pursue Jihad against rulers deemed 
to be apostate. 
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 The previous discussion has just traced back the birth and the growth 
of Islamist movements, mainly apolitical Salafists and militants whereas the 
Islamist political movements that grow from a group to a party have evolved 
drastically as follows. According to Zeghal (2004), the Islamist movements 
are far from homogenous. Pluralistic by nature, Moroccan Islamism can be 
divided into two groups: The Party of Justice and Development (Hizbo al- 
adala wa- Tanmia, PJD) under the direction of Abdelilah Benkiran, and 
Justice and Charity (al- adl wal- Ihsan, JC) led by Mohamed Abbadi 
(Amaghar, 2007)0F1. 
 In 1969, Abdel Karim Mouti founded, with his associate, Ibrahim 
Kamal the Jamaat Ashabiba Al- Islamiya Al- Maghribia (hereafter, Shabiba), 
the Moroccan Islamic Youth Association in Casablanca (Munson, 1986). 
While operating clandestinely, Shabiba and its leader Mouti concentrated on 
recruiting followers, on structuring the organizational base and on socializing 
and educating members (Darif, 1992). Influenced by Sayyid Qutb, Mouti 
adopted many of the phrases, symbols and slogans of Qutb's political 
terminology (Darif, 1992: 228). The Qutbian discourse appealed to many 
high school and university students and to educated segments of the 
Moroccan society (Belal, 2012: 114). In 1972, Mouti obtained a legal status 
for Shabiba, as a religious and educational association. He emphasized that 
his organization was apolitical and thus using non-violent means to spread 
Islamic moral values among Moroccans (Belal, 2012; Darif, 1992). Later on, 
Shabiba declared in a manifesto that one of its most urgent goals was 
confronting Moroccan Marxism (Darif, 1992: 226). Because of the 
confrontation of the régime with the leftist in general and its Neo- Marxist 
elements in particular, the régime supported and approved the organization 
in the aim of counter balancing the forceful political influence and political 
relevance of doctrinaire Neo Marxism (Ibahrine, 2007; Tozy, 1999). 
 As the organization grew rapidly, the régime attempted first to 
contain and co-opt the leadership of the organization and second to defame 
the organization and liquidate it if it refused the régime's offers. In 1975, 
after the murder of Omar Ben Jelloun, the regime announced that a group of 
people belonging to Shabbiba were arrested for this murder. This incident 
was used to justify the régime's harsh measures against Sabbiba (Darif, 
1992). Mouti left the country and was forced to lead the organization from 
abroad. In Belgium, he published Al Mujahid, a paper in which he increased 
his militancy and confrontational attitudes towards the regime by severely 
criticizing the monarchy and its policies. In the early 1980s, many senior 
members and activists formally withdrew or froze their membership (Shahin, 
                                                          
1 Abdeslam Yassine was the founder and the spiritual leader of the Jamaa till his death in 
2013. Now the Jamaa is led by Mohamed Abbadi. 
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1997: 188). A small number of young members such as BenKirane, Baha, 
Yatim and Othmani became interested in the formation of a political 
organization or a party (Belal, 2012: 118). In 1983, they announced the 
formation of Al- Jama'a al- Islamiya (the Islamic community) and sought 
official recognition for their organization. 
 While seeking formal legalization, Al- Jama'a was urged to change its 
name and drop any reference to Islam. In 1992, it became Harakat AL- Islah 
wat- Tajdid (Movement of Reform and Renewal, or MRR). The rationale 
behind changing the old name is four fold. First, the movement intended to 
avoid misperceptions of the monopoly of Islam. Second, it reasserts that the 
organization is one Islamic movement among many. Third, the movement 
seeks to confirm the movement's readiness to cooperate with other political 
and social organizations. Finally, it wants to highlight the main focus of the 
movement activities, which is to reform the conditions of the Muslims by 
renewing their understanding of Islam (Belal, 2012: 119; Darif, 1992: 276; 
Shahin, 1997: 190). 
 Nonetheless, much attention was focused on political participation. 
The movement of Al-Islah wat-Tajdid articulated the demands of its 
constituency and ensured the political participation. In 1992, the leaders of 
the movement announced the creation of a new political party "Hizb At-
Tajdid Al- Watani" (National Renewal Party, NRP) and applied for official 
recognition (Darif, 1999: 172). Although the group asserted that it did not 
monopolize Islam, nor did it claim to be its sole representative, the régime 
immediately refused to legalize the party (Ibahrine, 2007). 
 After failing to gain legal recognition, the party leaders were forced 
to seek fielding candidates in elections under the banner of officially 
recognized political parties. At the beginning, the MRR looked for a 
conservative party. After the failure of an attempt to infiltrate the Istiqlal 
party in 1993, it opted for a small and little-known political party, "Al-
Haraka Shaabia Doustouriya Dimoqratiya" (the Constitutional and 
Democratic Popular Movement CDPM) of Abdelkarim Al- khatib. Thanks to 
this latter, the Islamists gained access to political field and formal politics 
(Willis, 2004). 
 Harakat at- Tawhid wat- Tajdid (Movement of Unity and Renewal, 
MUR) was the product of the realignment and the unification of MRR and 
Rabitat al- Mustaqbal al- Islami (the League of the Islamic Future) of Ahmed 
Raissouni. The movement adopted the new name MUR; it also built up a 
sophisticated organization run by a leadership apparatus in charge of overall 
strategy as well as a ten-member Majlis Ashoura (consultation committee) 
(Darif, 1992; Ibahrine, 2007). 
 The unification with the Rabitat al- Mustaqbal al Islamihas played an 
important role in helping the party (CDPM) gain widespread support among 
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young Islam-oriented educated Moroccans. In October 1998, the 
Constitutional Democratic Popular Movement became formally Al- Adala 
Wat- Tanmiya Party (Party of Justice and Development, PJD). As the 
president of the party, Al- Khatib, explained that the change of the party's 
name in terms of a new orientation rather than in terms of a new focuses on 
new issues of justice and development (Willis, 2004). 
 All groups and organizations that constituted Islamist movements 
have different and diverse objectives. While the non- political groups have 
no concrete political objectives, they have a number of goals closely linked 
to the religious and moralistic dimension of Islam. On the other hand, the 
Islamist political movements, which are the subject of this study, target the 
restructuring of state- society relations in the image of Islam's early golden 
years; others raised issues of equity and justice in open public discourse. 
 This historical overview helps use locate the subject under study and 
trace back its itinerary from an organization through a movement then to a 
party. Therefore, PJD, as an Islamist party, has gone through a 
metamorphosis to reach such a status. However, members of the party reject 
being labeled Islamists; they prefer instead to be called Islam-oriented 
movements. 
 The interaction of religion and politics in the contemporary period 
has been associated with the rise of Islamist movements in the Arab world 
since 1970s. During that period, Islamist politics came to be characterized by 
a diversity of actors, modes of action and objectives. 
 Islamist movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional 
structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, 
influencing, or controlling cultural, educational and economic spheres 
(Yuvuz, 2003: 23). The rise of Islamist movements signaled the return of 
Islam as a rallying cry for socioeconomic opposition to the central authority. 
Those movements felt not only their economic welfare but also their 
traditional institutions and values under threat (Burgat, 2003). The 
movements are diverse in their activism because they can either be directed 
against the state or demand state power (Offe, 1985). In addition, they can 
shift from targeting the state to targeting society and everyday life or social 
codes (Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1981). 
 Nonetheless, Islamist movements did not deny engagement with the 
state, a denial that is built in the definition of "new social movements" by 
Alberto Melucci (1998) and others. In other words, Islamist mobilization was 
characterized by a contingent on everyday life before becoming ready to deal 
with the state (Tugal, 2006). According to social sciences, an Islamist 
movement is a social institution that has its own role and mobilization tools. 
These latter determine its goals, its political and/or ideological roots 
(Okacha, 2008: 8). Islamic political movements articulate complex social 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
6 
and economic issues and concerns. They rely on religious circles, an 
institutional network where its repository of Islamic symbols frame social 
and political issues, to disseminate its ideas and articulate a new set of blue 
prints for the reconstruction of state and society, individual faith, and 
community (Yuvuz, 2003: 35). Hence, several Islamist movements' 
typologies have been cited in the literature; yet, we mention some that serve 
the research goals. 
 According to Salwa Ismail (2003), Islamist actors can be classified, 
largely, into militants, conservatives and moderates. Each of these groupings 
tends to be characterized by particular social origins and modes of action. 
Broadly speaking, militants originate from lower-middle-class background. 
They have social and economic concerns at the heart of their agenda and 
have used violence as a means of action. Conservatives and moderates 
belong to middle classes with professionals as their main supporters. 
Whereas conservatives focus on morality issues and seek the Islamization of 
society and state institutions but not a take-over of political power, 
moderates attempt to work within the institutional channels of participation 
(Ibahrine, 2007). 
 In regard to Islamist movements with political inspiration, other 
scholars (Darif, 1992 and Entelis, 2002) distinguish between three different 
categories of contemporary Islamist movements: the radicals, the reformists 
and syntheticals. These three broadly defined types have different 
understandings of political and religious changes in the Moroccan context as 
well as different strategies to pursue their goals. This typology is based on a 
typology developed by Entelis (2005) and a typology elaborated by Darif 
(1992). 
 Radicals: They are those who adopted the term of Al- Jahiliya2. They 
argue that both the state and society have become un-Islamic. To re-Islamize 
the state and society, they use political violence and political assassination 
understood as Jihad. They do not tolerate "gradualism"3. They operate most 
of the time underground and are organized clandestinely into cells and 
networks (Ibahrine, 2007). Salafiya Al- Jihadiya serves as the paradigmatic 
example in Morocco. 
 Syntheticals: they reject the official interpretation and practices of 
Islam. Theoretically, they accept the democratic principles but refuse the 
participation in all aspects of the Moroccan society, except institutionalized 
                                                          
2. Historically, the age of pre-Islamic 'ignorance' associated with polytheism. It shows the 
lack of guidance of the community prior to the revelation of the Koran. For modern Islamist 
movements, the term can also refer to the situation of unbelief and corruption that 
characterized contemporary societies worldwide. (Volpi, 2011) 
3. It is the policy of seeking to change something or achieve a goal gradually rather than 
quickly or violently, especially in politics. From the Free Dictionary by Farlex 
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politics. Political change is not their ultimate target. They believe that 
political change must be the outcome of a "bottom-up" strategy of 
acculturation, socialization and education (ibid). In addition, strict religious 
education is at the center of their educational program. 
 Reformists: Educationally well-equipped, they want to transfer power 
by democratic procedures, including political organization, mobilization and 
participation. They totally reject violence as a means for bringing political 
and religious transformation. Unlike radicals, they refuse to work 
underground. Al- adala Wat- Tanmiya party or PJD (previously Al- Jama'a 
Al- Islamiya, the Islamist group) and Harakat Al- Islah wat- Tajdid Al- 
Maghribiya, the Moroccan Movement of Reform and Renewal, Harakat Al- 
Badil Al- Hadari (the Movement of Civilizational alternative), and Harakat 
Min Ajli Al Umma (the Movement for Nation), may serve as an equally 
illustrative type. 
 However, there are some Islam-oriented groups, which remain 
politically marginal in Morocco (Ibahrine, 2007: 111). These groups evade 
political dimension in their expression and their activities, and thus, advocate 
no political agenda. Their religious activities focus utterly on Da'wa. They 
accept the existing religious establishment and do not question the religious 
legitimacy of the monarchy; nor do they defy the official religious 
institutions. Jama'a at-Tabligh wad- Da'wa is the typical representation of 
non political Islamist movements. 
 Okacha (2008) differentiates between two types of typologies. The 
first takes into account the movement's goals. In this respect, there are 
movements that seek Da'wa (proselytizing) such as (Da'wa wat- Tabligh), 
and others who target politics like PJD and Al'Adl wa- al Ihsan. Within this 
typology, Okacha distinguishes between three different categories: 
revolutionary, participatory and left-oriented. The second typology is 
characterized by the mode of mobilization: they are either radical or 
moderate. In Morocco, the radicals are scarce and represent a minority, such 
as the Wahabbi Salafists and some militant groups such as Salafia Jihadia 
(Okacha, 2008: 47).  
 All the aforementioned typologies agree on the fact that Islamist 
movements are either radicals or moderates. However, they differ in labeling 
the third category such as syntheticals, conservatives and non-participants by 
Darif, Ismail and Okacha respectively, though they refer to the same 
category. 
Table 1. A synthesis of Islamist movements' typologies (It is mine) 
Darif Ismail Okacha 
Radicals 
Syntheticals 
Reformists 
Militants 
Conservatives 
Moderates 
Radicals 
Non participants 
Moderates 
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 Last but not least, many definitions have been used in the literature to 
define different trends among Islamism: moderate vs. radical or extremist, 
reformist vs. revolutionary, peaceful/civilian vs. violent or armed 
movements. While moderation and radicalism are by definition subjective 
and cannot be easily defined, the reformist-revolutionary divide could also 
be misleading in an authoritarian context and is likely to change over time 
within the same movement. This idea is of paramount importance in this 
study because it will assist my investigation into PJD's itinerary in quest for 
power. 
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